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I:\TRODLCTIO\ 
In 1986 Desmond Tucker was a controversial figure when 
he almost became the first recipient of a heart trans-
planted within New Zealand . It was subsequently decided as 
a matter of government policy that such operations should 
not proceed in this country . Mr Tucker and his family 
sought to raise the costs of an operation in Australia by a 
public fund-raising appeal. In the publicity which followed 
the cancellation of the initial operation, rumours about 
certain past criminal convictions of Mr Tucker began to 
circulate. The New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (BCNZ), 
News Media Ownership Limited (1MOL) and Auckland Star 
Limited ("Star") all learned of the convictions. The 
plaintiff applied on an ex parte basis for interim 
injunctions against the three media defendants to prevent 
them broadcasting or publishing these details of his 
private life. 
The first cause of action was submitted to be the tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on 
the principle set out in Wilkinson v Downton 1 and Stevenson 
v Basham2 . The second cause of action alleged a tort of 
invasion of privacy , for which there is no direct New 
Zealand or English authority . In the High Court3 Jeffries 
J . considered the facts of the case raised the issue of 
privacy in a dramatic form . 4 
The gravamen of the action is unwarranted publication 
of intimate details of plaintiff ' s private life which 
are outside the realm of legitimate public concern or 
curiosity. 
The judge, in granting an injunction agains ~ NMOL, accepted 
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that the right to privacy might provide the plaintiff with 
a valid cause of action in this country . Further ex parte 
injunctions were sought by, and granted to, Mr Tucker 
against BCNZ and " Star ". 
On 3 October 1986 McGechan J . discharged all three 
interim injunctions, partly because their authority had 
been subverted by the acts of third parties. The alleged 
convictions had been broadcast over the Wellington area 
twice by Radio Windy, and elsewhere in New Zealand by Radio 
Pacific and other independent radio stations. They had 
also been revealed by a newspaper in Sydney. McGechan J . 
considered the limited relief granted was achieving 
nothing . In the course of a full judgment the judge 
expressed views about the right of privacy in New Zealand. 
For example, a number of points of law reform were urged. 
One was that there should be some legislative action 
determining the extent of the right of privacy and the 
relationship of that right to the freedom of speech and 
expression5. McGechan J. was of the opinion that the 
courts are being forced into a position where the y must 
soon create new law as they see appropriate. Tucker v 
News Media Ownership Ltd . illustrates such a situation. 
The judge supported the introduction of an invasion of 
privacy tort into this country, but did not think it 
"beyond the common law to adapt the Wilkinson v Downton 
principles to significantly develop the same field and meet 
the same needs ." 6 
In light of the s e judicial comments an examination of 
the principle in Wilkins on v Downton 7 and its relationship 
to the principles of privacy becomes relevant . It is 
submitt ed that the t orts-of intentional infliction of 
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emotional distress and invasion of privacy are separate, 
independent causes of action, but that the former could be 
developed by courts in New Zealand to provide protection 
against unjustifiable invasions. The position in the 
United States where the torts of privacy and of intentional 
infliction exist side by side will be considered . 
THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE TORTS IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Wilkinson v Downton 
1 . The traditional position 
The courts of England and New Zealand have traditionally 
been fearful that the protection of intangible personal 
interests would open the floodgates of trivial claims. 
This is reflected in a statement made by Lord Wensleydale 
in the House of Lords in 1861: " [ m]ental pain or anxiety 
the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when 
the unlawful act causes that alone . "8 Recognition of mental 
suffering· is " parasitic" 9 upon a legally recog·nised cause 
of action . Lord Wensleydale, having made the statement 
quoted above, added'' ... though where a material damage 
occurs, and it is connected with it, it is impossible a 
jury, in estimating it, should altogether overlook the 
feelings of the party interested."10 For example, an action 
in trespass (assault) is available against a defendant for 
purely mental distress such as fright or terror caused by a 
direct threat of imminent bodily contact with the plaintiff 1! 
The tort of defamation is available where the defendant 
causes mental distress (humiliation, wounded pride) to the 
plaintiff by lowering his or her reputation in the etes of 
right - thinking members of society generally1? However, 
these actions will not be available if there is no direct 
threat of bodily contact, or no publication to a third 
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party . The fact of a recognised tort having been committed 
provides a guarantee of the genuineness of the claim . 
The term " parasitic " is not used by the courts, and 
was in fact criticised by Lord Denning in Spartan Steel and 
Alloys Ltd . v 1artin & Co. Ltd . 13 . evertheless, it is 
interesting to note that Thomas Atkins Street observed in 
1906,14 
[t]he treatment of any element of damage as a 
parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory 
stage of legal evolution . A factor which is today 
recognised as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be 
recognised as an independent basis of liability. 
At the turn of the century cases appeared in which the 
only injury alleged to have been suffered was mental 
distress , or physical harm brought about by mental distress. 
In Victorian Railwav Commissioners v Coultas15the Privy 
Council held that severe health-impairing shock, suffered 
as a result of a railway employee ' s negligence in allowing 
a near collision on a level crossing, was damage that was 
too remote by reason of the purely mental link . The Privy 
Council also considered it likely that there would be a 
flood of trivial or false claims if the action was allowed, 
and that it was impossible to prove the existence of purely 
mental distress . The defendant had contended that there 
had to be " impact"; that is, a contemporaneous phvsical 
injury, to prove the genuineness of the claim. This require-
ment . known as the "impact rule", although not expressly 
adopted by the Privy Council, was subsequently employed in 
United States jurisdictions as a convenient safeguard 
against these potential dangers16 , 
2 . The Wilkinson v Downton tort 
In 1 96 Wright J. in Wilkinson v Downton17 first laid 
down the principle that if a person wilfully does an act 
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"calculated" to cause harm to another , and in consequence 
causes physical harm through mental distress, a cause of 
action ar i ses in the absence of lawful justification of the 
act . In so doing the judge created a new tort . Thus, all 
intentional inf l iction of bodilv harm became actionable in 
the absence of a privilege 18 . Wilkinson v Downton unified 
the field of liability for physical injury , and supplemented 
the intentional wrongs of assault, battery and false 
imprisonment because liabilit y now followed injury 
intentionally caused, even if one of the legal ingredients 
of trespass was lacking . At the same time the court was 
recognising for the first time that certain conduct (words 
as well as physical aggression) causing severe emotional 
distress should not be countenanced. An action could lie 
for inju r y by shock sustained through the medium of eye or 
ear, without .direct contact . 
In Janvier v Sweenev 19 the principle was applied where 
private detectives, masquerading as military policemen , 
aclclressed threats to the plaintiff in order to frighten her 
into handing ove r certain letters . Bankes L . J . said " [ i]t 
is no longer contended that this was not a wrongful act 
which wo uld amount to an actionable wrong if the damage 
which the law recognises can be shown to have flowed 
directly from the act . 11 20 
The New Zealand Supreme Court granted similar relief 
in 1922. In Stevenson v Basham 2 1 a man visited a house 
occupied by the plaintiffs, and threatened to burn them out 
if he didn ' t get possession of the premises . The wife 
overheard the conversation from the room upstairs, and 
suffered,a miscarriage as a result of the shock . Herdman J . 
held that the case could be placed upon one of two grounds : 
he [t he d efPndan t 1 was negligent wh e n he uttered 
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the threat which did the harm, or he wilfully intended to 
do harm ." 22 Whether physical harm was caused by frig·ht or 
shock brought about either intentionally or negligently, 
He rdman J . held that the injury must arise from reasonable 
fear of personal injury . It can be seen that the judge, in 
incorporating this requirement, restricted the principle 
from Wilkinson v Downton . This restriction may not have 
been intended . There was no requirement that the injury 
must arise from r easonable fear of personal injury in 
either Wilkinson v Downton or Janvier y Sweeney . In the 
former case the plaintiff suffered shock as a result of 
believing something had befallen her husband, not from fear 
for herself. 
Furthermore, a fear of personal injury is not even 
required in the negligent infliction of nervous shock 
cases . Although early cases such as Dulieu v White & Sons 23 
attempted to confine recovery to persons who were within 
the area of physical danger and suffered shock through fear 
for their own safety, this requirement was abandoned in 
Hambrook v Stokes Bras Ltd?4 and recovery was allowed to 
persons who suffered shock through fear for the safety of 
someone else . The relevant risk to the plaintiff is the 
risk of shock. The Wagon Mound (No 1)25 states that the 
test for liability for nervous shock is the foreseeability 
of injury bv shock. McLaughlin v O' Brian26 held that a 
mother who suffered shock after seeing her injured family 
in hospital a few hours after an accident, was owed a duty 
of care by the driver who caused it . 
3. The limits to liabilitv 
Even though the courts were giving recognition to 
claims for prote c tion against mental distress, they still J 
wanted to fix definite limits to liability and to find some 
7 
way of guaranteeing the genuineness of claims . Wright J. 
in Wilkinson v Downton looked to the likelihood and 
presence of physical consequences as a determinant of 
liability. That is, the plaintiff's emotional distress 
must be accompanied by objective and substantial "physical 
or psychopathological consequences ." 27 Mental clistress per 
se is not given independent protection. 
4. Developments in the United States 
Hickey v Welch 28was the first American case to raise 
issues similar to those in Wilkinson v Downton. The defendant 
threatened and abused the plaintiffs with a pistol as he 
banked up earth around the toilet in the plaintiff's 
garden, making it impossible to use . The female plaintiff's 
neurasthenia (a debility of the nerves causing fatigue and 
listlessness) was aggravated, causing serious injury to her 
health . Liability was based by the Missouri Court upon the 
principle that where the defendant intentionally caused the 
plaintiff to suffer mental anguish which resulted in some 
nervous illness, an action lay. 
new tort . 
America had recognised the 
In the 1930's, a change in emphasis occurred in the 
United States 29. The courts began to formulate the rule of 
liability as a question of the likelihood of mental 
distress, rather than the existence of physical harm . 
Barnett v Collection Service Co . 3o involved the activities 
of debt collectors, and is typical of American cases in 
this area . 
The rule seems to be well -e stablished where the act is 
wilful! or malicious, as distinguished from being merely 
neglig·ent, that recovery may be had for mental pain, 
though no physical injury results .. .. 
Today in the United Stat~s the Res)atement (Second) of 
Torts defines liability in this way : 31 
8 
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally 
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to 
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress 
and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for 
such bodily harm . 
The right to recover damages for mental distress alone 
without consequent physical harm or nervous shock is thus 
limited in the United States to cases involving "extreme 
and outrageous " intentional invasions of someone ' s mental 
and emotional tranquility. This requirement serves, it is 
said 3 2 , to ensure the validity of the claim : " ... if the 
enormity of the outrage itself carries conviction that 
there has in fact been severe and serious mental distress. 
which is neither feigned nor trivial, bodily harm is not 
requirec!. 1133 
In England, by contrast, the tort has not developed so 
far, and remains as it was formulated by Wright J. in 
Wilkinson v Downton . In New Zealand Herdman J . •s34 
formulation of the principle appears to acid another 
limitation. It was submitted earlier 35 , however, that the 
rquirement for fear of personal injury is not good law . 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd.~ 
cited Salmond and Heuston ' s formulation of the tort : 37 
.. . one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intention 
-ally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress 
to another is liable for such emotional distress, 
proviclecl that bodily harm results from it. 
It is not clear whether nervous shock is included as 
"bodily harm" . Nervous shock was defined by Lore! Denning M.R. 
in Hinz v Berry3S as "any recognisable psychiatric illness . " 
It is submitted that "bodily harm" covers nervous shock as 
well as physical harm. 
5. A tort of significance? 
Although some writers 3ftave commented 1hat the principle 
laid clown in Wilkinson v Downton is of great significance 
[ 
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in that it is capable of being regarded as creating a general 
theory of l iability in tort for all inten tional infliction 
of harm, the principle has seldom appeared in the courts . 
After Janvier v Sweeney 40 in 1919, the last case in which 
the principle appears is Bunyan v Jordan 41 . Although the 
plaintiff did not succeed in that case , Dixon J . (later 
Chief Justice) of the High Court of Australia made it quite 
clear that damages for nervous shock are available if a 
defendant by his act or statement intends to cause nervous 
shock to a plaintiff and succeeds in doing so . 
Perhaps the absence of litigation can be explained by 
the fact that claims for emotional distress are in many 
cases met by other actions . For example, if the defendant 
has committed an act in the nature of an attempted battery, 
then a plaintiff has an action in assault for emotional 
disturbance . In addition . legal advisers may be unwilling 
to suggest that an action is available for the intentional 
infliction of mental distress. Now, in Tucker , the 
principle has been resurrected and judicially considered in 
relation to the right of privacy . Jeffries J . in the High 
Court 42 accepted that the right of privacy might provide 
the plaintiff with a valid cause of action in New Zealand: 
'' [i]t seems a natural progression of the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and in accordance with the 
renowned ability of the common law to provide a remedy for 
a wrong. '' 43 McGechan J . also supported the introduction of 
privacy as a separate tort . 44 Interestingly, both consider -
ered that Wilkinson v Downton can be developed by the 
courts to protect a right of privacy in certain circumstances . 
This suggests a possible two - step approach to the emotional 
distress tort which could be taken : 
1 
-
-
-
• I 
B 
1 . 
( i ) 
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the tort can be used on its own to provide a 
remedy for mental distress, and 
(ii) this in turn provides an avenue for remedying 
invasions of privacy . 
Privacy in New Zealand 
The traditional position 
A "right of privacy" has not so far been explicitly 
recognised by the courts of the United Kingdom or Australasia. 
However, although no commitment has been made to a new head 
of liability, privacy can be, and has been, incidentallv 
protected . For example. in Prince Albert v Strange45 
Prince Albert and Queen Victoria had made etchings of their 
children. The defendant had obtained impressions by 
improper means, and proposed to exhibit them. An injunction 
was granted on the basis of protecting a property right in 
the works, but , the Lord Chancellor pointed out 46 that a 
breach of trust, confidence or contract would itself 
entitle the plaintiff to a remedy . 
Another more recent example of our law incidentally 
protecting privacy is provided by Williams v Settle47 . The 
defendant was a professional photographer who had been 
engaged to take photographs at the plaintiff's wedding . 
Some time later the plaintiff's father-in-law was murdered 
and two newspapers published the photos after persuading 
the defendant to sell them. The plaintiff succeeded not on 
the basis of an unjustifiable violation of privacy, but for 
breach of copyright. Exemplary damages for mental 
suffering were awarded. 
Trespass provides a. remedy against actual physical 
intrusions into the plaintiff's territory, but peeping toms 
who operate from outside cannot be dealt with at law . The 
·-
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law of nuisance might be helpful, but it has been established 
for example, that there is no redress against aerial 
photography for commercial purposes 48 or the building of a 
platform to gain a view of the plaintiff's racecourse49 . 
In the latter case the defendant's activity did not, and 
was not intended, to interfere with the enjoyment of the 
plaintiff ' s land. Despite this, the Australian High 
Court ' s dicta seem to go further, and to support an 
unqualified right to overlook the premises of another, and 
repudiates any existence of a "g·eneral right of privacy"50. 
It is submitted that conduct devoid of any social utility 
and directed only to provoking annoyance, could be 
unreasonable interference and a nuisance. 
It is in the field of defamation that privacy seems to 
receive the most incidental protection . For example, in 
Honeysett v News Chronicle Ltd. 51 the defendants published 
a photo of Mrs Honeysett in cycling attire, accompanied by 
a young man who was not her husband. The photo illustrated 
an article entitled "Unchaperoned Holidays" . The plaintiff 
claimed there was an implication that she had been on 
holiday with this man, and committed adultery . The court 
accepted this interpretation - in effect the limited 
enforcement of a right of privacy . It appears that a 
blatant invasion of privacy induces the court to be 
sympathetic towards the suggestion that such implications 
are present. 
In Tollev v J.S.Fry & Sons Ltd.52 an advertisement had 
been published showing a caricature of Tolley, a prominent 
amateur golfer, playing golf with a bar of the defendant ' s 
chocolate protruding from his back pocket . The plaintiff 
argued that the drawing implied that he had agreed that his 
picture be used for commercial purposes, therefore 
.... 
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prostituting his reputation as an amateur . In the Court of 
Appeal, Greer L. J . regretfully gave judgment for the 
defendants on the ground that there was n o action available 
fo r the invasion of privacy in English law : 53 
I have no hesitation in saying that in my judgment 
the defendants in publishing the advert in question, 
without first obtaining Mr Talley's consent, acted in 
a manner inconsistent with the decencies of life, and 
in doing so they were guilty of an act for which there 
ought to be a legal remedy . 
In the House of Lords54 his decision was reversed; not 
because a right of privacy had been created, but because 
the court fitted the facts into the defamation framework . 
The court saw possible harm to the plaintiff's "name" as an 
amateur golfer, although it was not considered how an 
association with advertising would tend to lower him in the 
estimation of his fellow men. However, the case is 
authority for the proposition that unauthorised use of a 
person ' s name or picture for commercial purposes can be 
restrained under defamation law . 
It is interesting to compare an American case which in 
England would have involved defamation, but which was 
treated in the United States as a privacy issue . In Leverton 
v Curtis Publishing Co.55 the defendants had published a 
picture of the plaintiff as she appeared immediately after 
being struck by a vehicle in the street . The publication 
did not concern her accident, but accidents in general . 
Accompanying the picture was a heading which implied that 
the plaintiff had been stupid and careless. The last fact 
would have meant a possible remedy for defamation in 
England, but in the United States it was held to be an 
invasion of privacy. 
Thus there has been n o explicit recognition of 
in vasion of privacy as a·tJrt in itself in England or New 
Zealand . As illustr ated . th e courts have moved forward 
• 
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only where possible within the confines of existing 
concepts such as nuisance and defamation . In one writer's 
view 56this hesitation is partly due to the reluctance of 
the courts to deal with claims of mental distress, and 
partly to the difficulty of drawing a line between what 
should and should not be tolerated in our society. There 
are values which compete strongly with privacy, and a court 
dealing with such an issue must determine when an intrusion 
becomes offensive by prevailing standards of propriety. It 
is instructive to examine how the United States juris-
dictions have grappled with this problem . 
III PRIVACY I THE UNITED STATES 
1 . Development of the tort 
The development of a recognised right of privacy in 
America stemmed in large part from an academic article 
·tt . 1890 b W l B ! · 57 wri en in y arren anc ranceis . They argued that 
existing case law (drawn mainly from England) contained the 
elements necessary to formulate a general concept of privacy. 
Existing heads of liability were being used, they 
submitted, to protect incidental interests of privacy. 
These interests could logically be isolated from existing 
remedies and seen as a separate and independent head of 
liability . They argued that implicit recognition of a 
right to privacy should be made explicit and expansive. 
They tried to show that the "new" tort already had roots in 
common law. 
The tort of privacy has flourished in U. S. juris-
dictions since the beginning of the century. In 1960 
Prosser58 analysed the ptivacy decistons to date, and 
argued that the invasion of privacy is not one tort, but a 
L 
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complex of four . That is, t he law of p r ivacy comprises 
four distinct kinds of i nvasion which share the same 
umbrella name but have little else in common. Prosser ' s 
classification has been widely accepted in America . The 
four invasions may be described as follows : 
2 . 
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff ' s seclusion or s oli t ude, 
or into his private affairs . 
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts 
about the plaintiff . 
(3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false 
light in the public eye. 
( 4 ) appropriation, for the defendant ' s advantage, of 
the plaintiff ' s name and likeness . 
Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts 
The second category is the most troublesome because it 
is the most likely to conflict with other interests such as 
the freedom of speech. It is the main focus of this paper . 
The approach the early courts took, especially in 
regard to the public disclosure of embarrassing facts , is 
shown by Melvin v Reid59, a case cited by McGechan J . in 
Tucker . The plaintiff had been a prostitute, and in 1918 
was tried for murder and acquitted . She alleged that she 
subsequently reformed and married into respectability . In 
1925 the defendants made a film based on her early life , 
mentioning her name and advertising the fact that it was a 
" true story ". The court stated that the r ight of privacy 
was absent from the common law, thereby refuting the propositions 
of Warren and Brandeis . The court grounded recovery in the 
Californian Constitution which guaranteed (in a provision 
which no longer exists) the right to pursue and obtain 
happiness . 
[ 
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Briscoe v Readers ' Digest Association Inc60 was also 
cited by McGechan J. in his judgment . The defendant wrote 
an article discussing the hijacking of lorries, and 
referring to the plaintiff by name in connection with an 
eleven-year old incident of the same nature in which he had 
played a part . The plaintiff alleged that after the 
incident he had become fully rehabilitated and had led a 
respectable life until the publication of the article which 
caused even his family and close friends to shun hjm. 
Reversing the trial court view that there was no legal 
cause of action, the Supreme Court Of California said : 
In a nation built upon the free dissemination of 
ideas, it is always difficult to declare that 
something may not be published. But the great general 
interest in an unfettered press may at times be out-
weighed by other great societal interests. As a people 
we have come to recognise that one of these societal 
interests is that of protecting an individual's right 
of privacy . The right to know and the right to have 
others not know are, simply considered, irreconcilable. 
But the right guaranteed by the First Amendment does 
not require total abrogation of the right of privacy . 
The goals sought by each may be achieved with a minimum 
of intrusion upon the other . . . 
As an indication of the balancing process to be carried 
out, the Supreme Court handed down some points for 
consideration by the trier of fact: 
(1) whether the plaintiff had become a rehabilitated 
( 2 ) 
member of society; 
whether identifying him as a former criminal would 
be highly offensive and injurious to a r easonable 
person; 
(3) whether the defendant published the information 
with a reckless disregard for its offensiveness; 
(4) whether an y independent justification existed for 
printing the plaintiff's identity . 
It can thus be seen that ther e are many approaches to the 
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problem of invasion of privacy in America. The courts are 
not tied to the mechanical requirements of, for example, an 
action in defamation or nuisance, but rather are free to 
look at the principle of privacy behind the remedy . 
last sixty years, a general right of privacy has been 
recognised in most American states . 
INVASION OF PRIVACY - AN INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIO AL DISTRESS 
In the 
It is submitted that in the majority of cases involving 
severe mental distress, the severity of that distress will 
be evidenced by either physical injury or nervous shock 
(that is, what lawyers call psychiatric injury). However, 
there are of course cases where severe mental distress 
alone may be caused. For example, an invasion of privacy 
could well cause great distress. 
In the U.K. and New Zealand the Wilkinson v Downton 
tort presently requires that the defendant's statement or 
act result in physical injury or nervous shock. In Tucker 61 
the disclosure of private facts about the heart patient may 
have precipitated significant harm to him through stress 
and upset. Such physical harm would have evidenced the 
genuineness of his claim. In applying Wilkinson v Downton, 
the courts would be protecting mental distress insofar as 
it caused recognisable physical harm. Although the harm 
suffered results from the infliction of emotional distress, 
the plaintiff is recovering for that resulting harm and not 
for emotional distress alone. The cases are of physical 
harm caused by shock rather than by impact. 
It is submitted that in the future the courts could 
move to protect emotional security per se62 . If the 
requirement for injury or nervous shock was relaxed (as it 
' 
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has been in the United States) mental di s tress such as 
grief, humiliation and anger could be remedied as falli n g 
within the scope of the principle . 
If this development could be brough t about, what 
limits should then be placed upon recovery? Firstly, the 
act or statement must in fact produce mental distress if it 
is to be actionable . The courts would have to recognise 
the distress as significant: that is, it should be 
substantial and enduring rather than transient . It is 
difficult to define what amounts to " serious" mental distress; 
the parameters of liability will be worked out on a case by 
case basis . However, it should not be necessary for the 
mental distress to produce physical harm or nervous shock 
to be " serious" . Secondly, the act or statement should be 
of a kind reasonably capable of causing serious mental 
distress to a normal human being . Prosser states " [ l]iability 
cannot be extended to every trivial indignity . . . There is 
liability [only] for conduct exceeding all bounds usually 
tolerated by society, of a nature which is especially 
calculated to cause and does cause mental damage of a very 
serious kind . "63 
If the Wilkinson v Downton tort progressed in this 
way, it is possible to see that a cause of action would be 
available in all cases of intentional, unjustifiable 
invasion of privacy. The important issue for the courts becomes 
how to determine whether any particular "invasion" is 
justifiable or not. 
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V THE BALANCING OF INTERESTS 
1. Justification 
Justification is the showing of a sufficient reason, 
by the defendant, why he did what he is called upon to 
answer . In the law of defamation the truth is placed in 
high regard, therefore a true publication is often justified . 
Where privacy (especially the public disclosure of private 
facts) is in issue, the basis of the action is the publication 
of truthful information. Thus, another interest competes 
with an interest in the truth - the right of the individual 
to lead a private life. 
An American defamation case, Burton v Crowe11 64 
involved the publication of a picture held to be prima 
facie actionable, despite the fact that it did not state a 
fact or an opinion, was obviously an optical illusion, and 
carried its correction on its face . Judge Learned Hand 
said,65 
The common law has so much regard for the truth that 
it excuses the utterance of anything that is true 
( . . . ) The only reason why the law makes truth a 
defence is not because a libel must be false, but because 
the utterance of truth is in all circumstances an 
interest paramount to reputation. 
Thus, where the truth does not avail as a countervailing 
interest there is no defence to the defamation action. 
Where an interest such as privacy is at issue, the truth 
cannot automatically be said to be paramount . The judges 
in Tucker considered this point . Jeffries J. said "if a 
person's right of privacy has been, or is to be violated, 
it is no defence that what was or is to be published, is 
correct or published without malice."66 McGechan J. 
remarked67 that it is a notable feature of the tort of 
invasion of personal privacy in America that truth is not a 
clefence. 
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It is submitted that the truth or falsity of a 
publication is one of the factors to be balanced when 
considering the defence of justification. It is not 
reasonable to hold that truth is a defence in defamation 
and not in the tort of privacy . Firstly, there may be 
situations when items of information cannot be classified 
easily as either true or false. Often facts will fall 
within a grey area where the context gives the wrong 
impression of the data, or where significant facts are 
omitted. Secondly, it is easier in theory than in practice 
to say that defamation protects reputation . and privacy 
protects emotional security, and therefore truth is a 
defence only in the former. It is submitted that all the 
circumstances have to be looked at in each particular case, 
and the interests to be protected weighed carefully. In 
some circumstances the truth of the matter will not weigh 
heavily; for example, if the publication was for no better 
reason than to satisfy an audience's curiosity. On the 
other hand, the truth of the facts will be crucial if the 
defendant had a legitimate reason for publishing them. In 
an action for the protection of privacy, truth or falsity 
is not a determining factor. 
must go further. 
2 . The balancing act 
The balancing of interests 
It may be instructive to examine some American tort of 
privacy cases to see what issues arise, and how the courts 
determine when an unjustifiable invasion has occurred. 
In the United States the simple standard that the 
plaintiff must prove tha~ the defendant committed an unreason-
able or unwarranted invasion of his or her right of privacy68 
permits the conflicting policies and interests to be 
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bro ught ou t into the open . The co ur ts have attemp t ed t o 
formulate a clear means of distinguishing between 
legitimate p ub l ications and breaches of the right of 
privacy - particularly i n cases i nvolving media defendants . 
I n t he United States great sanctity is accorded the 
public i nterest in freedo m of expression and of the press . 
Although this interest has been and is discussed in 
relation to the constitutional right to free speech 
(enshrined in t he First Amendment), a limitation on the 
right to privacy was developed in the state courts early in 
the career of the tort which was not gro unded in the Constitution . 
This was the " newsworthiness " exception - a product of 
judicial social policy . To determine what was " newsworthy " , 
a distinction was drawn between private individuals and 
public figures . In Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co . 69 
it was held that one who seeks public office or claims 
p ublic approval or patronage, waives his or her right to 
privacy and cannot restrain any proper investigation . The 
idea of waiver or consent is often unrealistic . For example, 
a picture of the plaintiff ' s wife in Metter v L . A. Examiner 70 
was published in connection with a story about her 
committing suicide . It was held that the victim had 
willingly become an actor in an occurrence of public 
interest and had thus waived her right to privacy . It is 
submitted that the propriety of a consent or waiver defence 
should be assessed in terms of whether there is an 
overriding public interest in the free dissemination of 
information about the event . rather than on the basis of an 
assertion about the person ' s intent at the time of 
invasion . 
The courts in America have been described as making a 
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"naked creative choice", a "decision-making without signposts"?l 
This can be contrasted for example with the making of a 
decision about what is "reasonable". That choice is not 
made in a vacuum. The courts build upon previous decisions 
about what is reasonable and make distinctions between 
them . It is said that the courts are doing more than this 
in privacy cases. Any issue which involves a limitation of 
freedom of speech is bound to be controversial. Britton 
suggests that no body of consistent case law has been 
developed. 
the law. 
There is a lack of logic in the application of 
The outcome of any case is "a lottery" 72 . The 
current state of the law of privacy in the U. S . is so fluid 
that the privacy doctrines have been compared to a "haystack 
in a hurricane" . 73 
In Melvin v Reicl 74 the action was allowed on the basis 
that a publication should not be allowed to prejudice a 
rehabilitated person . This can be compared with Sidis v 
f . R Publishing Corp. 75 The plaintiff was a recluse employed 
in menial work, who had been a famous child prodigy years 
previously. Efforts to avoid publicity succeeded until an 
article was published in the "New Yorker" magazine, 
detailing his personal habits and eccentricities at length. 
The court denied recovery because the plaintiff had once 
been a public figure and so his departure from the 
limelight was of legitimate public interest. This is, in 
effect, an extension of the newswort hiness exception to a 
situation where the subject had ceased to be newsworthy 
until the offending publication. The media are creating 
their own definition of "news" . 
Distinctions can obviously be made between Melvin and 
• Sidis. but it is submitted that t o a great extent they 
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would be artificial. The courts ha ve been making, in 
regard to the privacy cases, a nak ed creative choice about 
that i n wh ich the public has a r easonable right to be 
interested. A decision about what ought to be of public 
interest can perhaps be criticised as unsuitable for a 
court to have to make . 
However, do the co urts not und ertake this role wh en 
deciding what is fair comment upon a ma tter of public 
intere~ in defamation cases? The defence of fair comment 
is the very essence of the right of freedom of speech. The 
rhetoric is that all citizens should have a right to openly 
air their views on matters which concern them. The facts 
commented up on should be of public interest even though the 
mat ter arises in regard to expressions of opinion and not 
the r eporting of facts. If a comment published by the 
defendant to th e public is to be judged fair, then the 
person or matter commented on must in some way be in the 
public arena . It is submitted that the question whether or 
not a matter is in that arena is a more objective one than 
that of deciding what ought to interest the public - the 
task the U.S. courts undertake when they determine the 
balance between the privacy of the individual and the 
demands of contemporary society. ?6 
3 . Freedom of speech 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees freedom of speech and of the press. This 
provision has been interpreted very widely by the U.S . 
Supreme Court . The emphasis placed on freedom of speech 
did not prevent the development of the tort of privacy, but 
it is inherently limited by these constitutional 
co1Aiderations , as are the fields of defamation and intentional 
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infliction of mental distress - especially in relation to 
media defendants . For example, in N. Y. Times Co. v Sullivan 77 
an elected official brought a defamation suit. Patently 
false allegations were made against the plaintiff in a 
newspaper . With the Constitution firmly in mind, together 
with the need for discussion of political issues, the Court 
held that a public official could not succeed in defamation 
unless he or she could prove that the statement was made 
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not . "78 In effect, 
the fault requirement was raised. In Falwell v Flynt 79 the 
court held that the same level of protection should be 
accorded the defendant in an action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress as in a defamation action 
- and required the defendant to prove knowledge of falsity 
or reckless disregard of the truth . 
Thus one cannot help but notice the negative repurcussions 
of the Constitution in the U.S. where the extreme to which 
freedom of speech has been taken has obscured developments 
made in the protection of privacy and emotional security. 
The countervailing value placed on protecting public 
discussion which kept the tort of privacy in check must 
itself be kept within bounds, or much practical protection 
will be lost. 
In the United Kingdom. too, freedom of speech has been 
accorded great weight - although the U.K . , like New 
Zealand, has no written constitution. In Re X (A minor)SO 
the wardship iur iscliction was used to 1..LY to prohibit the 
publication of a book concerning· the ware!' s deceased father 
and material which was likely to cause her psychological 
damage if it ever came to her notice . The Court of Appeal 
L~W L\'.lRt.r.Y 
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unanimously held that freedom of speech should prevail . 
Lord Denning M.R. said that "it would be extending the 
wardship jurisdiction too far and infringing too much upon 
the freedom of the Press for us to grant an injunction in 
this case." 81 Roskill L.J. and Sir John Pennycuick did 
however consider that it was the courts' clear duty to 
attempt to balance competing interests, even though in this 
instance freedom of speech prevailed. 
It is interesting to compare the approach taken by a 
German court8 2 . A televison film was made about Lebach, a 
former accessory to a gang which had carried out an armed 
robbery on an American military installation in Germany. 
The plaintiff was not "rehabilitated" in the way, for 
example, that the plaintiffs in Briscoe 83 and Tucker were . 
He was, in fact, about to be released from prison for good 
behaviour. The German Constitution protects both the 
interests of privacy and of freedom of expression expressly, 
therefore the Court had to openly consider the seemingly 
incompatible values . Interestingly, the court stressed 
factors in favour of the plaintiff; for example, 
considering the wider interest of ''reintegrating the 
criminal into society." The time and purpose of the 
publication also weighed in their balance. A legitimate 
desire to inform the public is more likely to receive 
protection than a sensational account published some time 
after the event. The German court was prepared to prohibit 
the showing of the film. 
4. The balancing act in ew Zealand 
A cause of action which potentially punishes for the 
publication of true s atements must naturally be carefully 
cLrcumscribed. However, the countervailing value placed on 
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protecting public discussion must itself be kept within 
bounds . If the Wilkinson v Downton principle is developed 
in New Zealand to provide an area of judicial expansion for 
privacy law, then the courts in this country should, it is 
submitted, learn from the U.S . experience and ensure their 
rules for recovery strike an appropriate balance between 
safeguarding speech and expression . and protecting an 
interest in emotional security . 
There is difficulty in articulating a standard for 
determining what types of personal information should be 
protected from public disclosure. The information revealed 
must be private . Whether a court treats particular facts 
as private depends largely on the general community's 
attitude rather than a fixed norm. 
In Tucker it was clear that the judges did not 
consider the plaintiff's past criminal re cord of legitimate 
public interest. McGechan J. refers84 to the "thorny 
problem" of expunging· criminal convictions after a lapse of 
time, and suggests that a court power to suppress names 
would ha ve been an effective solution to the case. This is 
the point made in the Lebach85 case; it is important for a 
society that people can rehabilitate without fear of exposure . 
Mr Tucker had been rehabilitated for nine years . The Court 
of Appeal did . however, allude to the possible argument 
that a plaintiff who undertakes a public fundraising drive, 
whether from choice or not. "may in some circumstances have 
to accept a certain amount of investigation of his history .•• S6 
This involves considering the interest the public have in 
being informed about that for which they are being asked to 
give money. However, McGechan J. did not put undue weight 
on this "qualification to privacy." '7 He considered it 
unfair to hold against the plaintiff an inevitable 
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situation. 
Judicial notice was taken of the fact that the 
plaintiff's condition was such that any stress arising from 
adverse publication could be lethal. This can be seen as 
literally a ''right to life'', and is a powerful consideration 
weighing against any possible benefit for the public 
arising from open discussion of important issues. McGechan J. 
remarked88 that reading or seeing an adverse media item has 
not traditionally been known to result in immediate lethal 
consequences . He added that some risk could be run, as 
long as the fact that a serious risk area exists is borne 
in mind. 
The judge also regarded freedom of speech as important 
in Tucker, '' but by no means the decisive element which the 
news media seeks to demand.' 1 89In balancing the considerations, 
McGechan J. was moved to discharge the injunctions by the 
overriding fact that some elements of the media were being 
restrained and others not, and the law should not engage in 
futility . Although the injunctions protecting Mr Tucker's 
private interests were correct when granted, they were 
subverted by subsequent events. 
VI THE RELATIONSHIP OF WILKINSON V DOW TON TO PRIVACY 
1 . Salient differences and similarities 
The Tucker judgments indicate that the courts in New 
Zealand may use the law to meet perceived privacy needs . 
The torts of privacy and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress exist side by side in the United States . 
This fact seems to suggest that the causes of action ·exist 
to protect quite different interests of the plaintiff . 
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There are some obvious clifferences between the actions. 
Fault is irrelevant in an action involving invasion of 
privacy by disclosure of private facts . The basis of the 
action is the publication of truthful information. 
Privacy actions, like those in defamation, require no 
physical impact on the plaintiff or any physical manifest-
ation of the emotional harm suffered . In the U.S . some 
courts have recognisecl the right to recover damages for the 
intentional infliction of purely mental distress without 
consequent physical harm or nervous shock . The reason for 
allowing recovery in such cases is because ''the interest in 
freedom from severe emotional clistress is regarded as of 
sufficient importance to require others to refrain from 
conduct intended to invade it. " 90 In England and Australasia, 
liability is based on the fact that the mental distress 
caused physical harm. 
There are also some prima facie similarities between 
the torts . Both theories of liability can be said to be 
aimed at protecting the plaintiff ' s emotional security and 
well-being . Defamation, by way of comparison, seeks to 
protect the plaintiff's reputation . 
In addition, both the torts can encompass conduct 
broader than the mere publication of information . For 
example, an overly aggressive news-gatherer might conceivably 
be liable under one or both causes of action. 
Finally, neither tort appears to make truth or falsity 
a necessarily decisive factor . 
truth is an absolute defence . 
2 . The torts in action 
In an action for defamation, 
It is the experience in the U. S. that the theoretical 
clistinctlons outlined above are difficult to maintain in practice. 
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Tile re is much over lapping· between the torts, together with 
defamation. For example, plaintiffs often recover for 
emotional distress when it has been held that an action 
lies for defamation . Thus in the U.S . there are available 
to potential litigants three possible causes of action in 
cases where some violation of privacy is alleged to have 
occurred: defamation, privacy, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress . A single tortious publication may 
give rise to all three. Mead91 draws attention to the 
point that pleading intentional infliction on its own or in 
combination with defamation and privacy claims may allow 
plaintiffs to succeed where otherwise they would have been 
hindered by the technical requirements of those actions . 
In the recent case of Falwell v Flynt 92 the U.S . Court of 
Appeals ruled that the Reverend Jerry Falwell was entitled 
to damages for emotional distress . Larry Flynt had 
published in his magazine " Hustler" a parody of an advert 
which implied that Falwell had committed incest with his 
mother. Falwell sued Flynt under all three causes of 
action . In the federal court the district judge dismissed 
Falwell ' s claim of invasion of privacy. In Virginia the 
aspect of privacy in issue is governed by legislation93 . 
The statute prohibits the use of a person ' s name or 
likeness for the purposes of trade or advertising without 
his or her consent . Falwell's name was not held to be used 
for the purposes of trade . The jury decided on the other 
two issues that Flynt had not defamed Falwell because the 
actual malice standard had not been met , but did intend to 
inflict emotional distress . An appeal followed . The Court 
of Appeals decided that intentional infliction is a tort 
separate from defamation. If one claim falls , the other 
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can still stand . This case illustrates the growing trend 
towards pleading all three torts in actions arising from 
tortious publications. 
3 . Predictions for the future 
In 1962 Wade94 examined the fields of defamation and 
invasion of privacy and suggested that the privacy tort 
would supplant the former, only to be supplanted itself by 
the tort of i ntentional infliction of emotional distress. 
[T]here is real reason to conclude that the principle behind 
the law of privacy is much broader than the idea of 
privacy itself, and that the whole law of privacy will 
become a part of the larger tort of intentional 
infliction of mental suffering . That tort would then 
absorb established torts like assault and defamation 
and invasion of the right of privacy and join them 
together with other innominate torts to constitute a 
single, integrated system of protecting plaintiff's 
peace of mind against acts of the defendant intended 
to disturb it. The development is clearly discerable 
to the perceptive eye . .. 
Twenty years later Mead 95 carried out an empirical study of 
relevant case law, and wrote that Wade ' s theory cannot be 
proven or disproven . He considered that the close relation -
ship between the interests protected by the defamation, 
privacy, and emotional distress torts has resulted in some 
confusion in the U.S . courts about the application of the 
different theories . His study revealed an increasing 
association between privacy and defamation law, which 
supports part o f Wade ' s theory . He also suggests that gaps 
in the law of privacy might influence use of the emotional 
distress tort to cover those areas. 
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CONCLUSION 
The development of the principles in Wilkinson v 
Downton extends to and beyond the protection of privacy, 
and imposes prima facie liability for the unjustifiable 
infliction of harm. It is submitted that the Wilkinson 
vDownton tort, as it is recognised in New Zealand, can be 
extended succesfully to cover invasions of privacy . The 
tort of privacy itself has been recognised for the first 
time in this country in Tucker . but suitable common law 
parameters or legislation will need to be slowly and 
carefully developed . 
Common law expansion of the principles in Wilkinson v 
Downton will enable courts to consider and carefully 
balance the interests involved in the controversial area of 
privacy and freedom of speech . Until such time as a 
satisfactory statutory scheme of privacy protection can be 
developed, the New Zealand courts can use and shape 
existing law to meet perceived privacy needs, without 
having to import a " ready-made" body of privacy law such as 
that which exists in the United States . 
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